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N ever-increasing number of Texas decisions are coming down interpret-
ing and applying the Uniform Commercial Code.' Business transactions in
Texas have been subject to the Code for eight years, and the expectation
is being realized -that Code provisions would be cited and argued in commer-
cial litigation. There is good assurance in Texas and elsewhere that the
Code is producing certainty and uniformity in the law governing commercial
transactions. However, the Code is massive and complicated legislation, and
it is predictable that provisions will be overlooked or misunderstood. While
the main purpose of this survey is informational, pointing up interesting and
significant decisions, some attention will be given to what appear to be omis-
sions or misconstruction of statutory language. Undoubtedly the diligence
of counsel does not always bring to light all pertinent statutory provisions,
and the persuasiveness of counsel may lead a court down the wrong road.
All decisions which will be discussed can be categorized under the rubrics
of bills and notes, sales, and secured transactions. Within these topics are
to be found a considerable variety of problems involving the UCC and its
operation in changing old rules and procedures and in confirming and clari-
fying previously accepted rules and doctrines.
I. BILLS AND NOTES
Final Payment of Check. In Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust2
Wertz was general manager for an insurance company and Baker was his
assistant. Baker had borrowed $1505 from the insurance company, and
Wertz had guaranteed payment of the notes which evidenced Baker's in-
debtedness. Wertz paid and received possession of the notes, for which
Baker gave Wertz a check for $1505 payable to the insurance company.
The check was drawn on the Richardson Heights Bank. Payment of the
check was stopped and Wertz' secretary inquired on several successive days
whether Baker's check was good. Two weeks after payment was stopped,
the bank indicated that the check was good. Wertz' office then endorsed
the check in the insurance company's name, presented it to the bank, and
received a cashier's check payable to the insurance company. Wertz re-
turned -the notes to Baker and deposited the cashier's check in the insurance
company's account at a second bank. Two days later the Richardson
* B.S., J.D., University of Washington; S.J.D., University of Michigan. Profes-
sor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. Uniform Commercial Code, 1972 Official Text with Comments, hereafter re-
ferred to as "UCC." The UCC became effective in Texas in 1966 and is to be found
in the Texas Business and Commerce Code.
2. 495 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1973), rev'g 482 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1972).
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Heights Bank wrote Wertz and the insurance company that Baker's check
should not have been paid because of a stop order. A computer error had
been made. The bank asked for return of the cashier's check and even-
tually refused to pay it. The court of civil appeals reversed judgment in
favor of Wertz for $1505. The supreme court reversed the court of civil
appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The court of civil appeals reasoned that Wertz could not assert that he
was damaged by anything the bank did "because he had already paid 'the
insurance company and received the notes from it before either check was
issued. Being neither payee nor endorsee of either check, he was not a
holder in due course."'3  The court denied that Wertz had lost anything by
relying on the cashier's check because he had a judgment against Baker for
$1505 plus $1000 exemplary damages.
In last year's Survey this writer suggested that the court of civil appeals
had overlooked sections 3-418 and 4-213 of the UCC.4 The insurance com-
pany was the payee on Baker's notes and check and qualified as a holder
in due course. Wertz stood in the shoes of the insurance company and re-
ceived "final payment" of Baker's check from the drawee bank. The pur-
pose of sections 3-418 and 4-213 is to protect holders in due course and
others who change their position in good faith upon receiving final payment
from the payor on an instrument. 5
In reversing the court of civil appeals, the supreme court made no men-
tion of the above sections dealing with final payment, but rather discussed
the nature of a cashier's check. The check was a bill of exchange, accepted
when issued and constituting an agreement to pay according to the tenor
on its face, hence it was not subject to a stop order under sections 4-303
and 4-403 of the UCC. 6 Plaintiff could not be charged with the failure
of defendant bank "to timely respond to Baker's stop payment order." The
court concluded that Wertz was a holder in due course, having given value
in paying Baker's notes and later surrendering them to Baker. Section 3-
302 did "not require that the name of the holder be placed in the instru-
ment," and Wertz was "'beneficial owner' of the cashier's check as well as
the holder in due course. ' 8
The dissenting opinion, concurred in by three justices, put the question
of stop order to one side. No third party had asked defendant bank not
to pay the cashier's check; hence, the question was simply one of whether
defendant had a valid defense on the obligation represented by its cashier's
check. Certainly the defense of fraud or lack of consideration could be set
up against the payee of the check. Money paid in violation of a stop order
could be recovered if the payee had not changed his position. Therefore,
3. 482 S.W.2d at 694. The court relied on TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §
3.302 (1968).
4. Larson, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J.
67, 72, 73 (1973). The cited sections may be found in TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE
ANN. §§ 3.418, 4.213 (1968).
5. In particular, see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-418, Comments 2 & 3.
6. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.303, 4.403 (1968).




plaintiff could not recover unless he showed that he was a holder in due
course or had changed his position in reliance on the cashier's check. Plain-
tiff was not a holder in due course under section 3-302 because he was not
a "holder" as defined in section 1-201.9 The conclusions of the court of civil
appeals were quoted by the dissent to the effect that plaintiff had not
changed his position in reliance on either Baker's check or the cashier's
check. Since plaintiff did not question the lower court's holding that he had
not made a detrimental change in position, the dissent argued that the lower
court's judgment should be affirmed.
It appears that the dissenting opinion has the best argument as to plain-
tiff's status as a holder in due course. Plaintiff was not a payee or endorsee
of either Baker's check or the cashier's check, and neither instrument was
bearer paper. Nevertheless, the insurance company would have qualified
as a holder in due course if it had taken Baker's check and had received
the cashier's check in payment therefor. 10 While Wertz was not a holder in
due course of Baker's check, he was a bona fide purchaser and beneficial
owner, having paid Baker's debt. In receiving the cashier's check, Wertz ob-
tained "final payment" of Baker's check under section 4-213. Under section
3-418 such payment is final in favor of "a person who has in good faith
changed his position in reliance on the payment" as well as of a holder in
due course. If the bank had caught Wertz' secretary as she was going out
the door with the cashier's check, no doubt a valid demand for its return,
based on mistake, could have been made. But the facts were such that Wertz
was lulled into a sense of security. He deposited the check and returned
Baker's notes, and two days elapsed before defendant bank asked for return
of the cashier's check. This is a type of case to which sections 3-418 and
4-213 are addressed.
In summary, it is submitted that the dissent manifests a sounder under-
standing of what a holder in due course is than does the majority opinion.
The key issue in the case was whether Wertz's reliance on the issuance of
the cashier's check barred the bank's defense of mistake. On this issue the
supreme court came to a correct result, although the pertinent sections of
UCC were not relied upon.
Unauthorized Endorsement by Payee's Employee. In DoAll Dallas Co. v.
Trinity National Bank" an employee received checks payable to his em-
ployer (plaintiff). The employee endorsed the checks in the name of the
employer, endorsed in his own name, and deposited them to his own account
in defendant bank. The employee misappropriated $25,000 before he was
apprehended. Plaintiff was denied recovery in the trial court because of
accord and satisfaction between the plaintiff and the employee. On appeal,
the court of civil appeals rendered judgment against defendant bank.
The appellate court construed the jury's findings as not discharging de-
fendant -to the extent that the accord and satisfaction had not been per-
formed. With respect to the bank's liability for collecting the deposited
9. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201 (1968).
10. A payee can qualify as a holder in due course under id. § 3.302.
11. 498 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973).
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checks and putting the proceeds to the employee's credit, the trial court sub-
mitted issues of negligence and "contributing cause" under section 3-406 of
the UCC. 12  The employer was found negligent, but the jury also found
that the bank "failed to act in accordance with existing reasonable commer-
cial standards of the banking community. '13  Hence the bank was not en-
titled to the benefit of section 3-406. Defendant argued that plaintiff's neg-
ligence offset the bank's negligence and proximate cause. The court an-
swered: "We do not agree. The cause of action against the 'bank was for
conversion, as well as for negligence. Contributory negligence is not a de-
fense to liability for conversion.' 4 Plaintiff's negligence had to be the prox-
imate cause for loss in order for defendant to be excused from liability.
Statutory authority for treating defendant bank as a converter is found
in section 3-419 of the UCC, 15 which was not cited by the court. Conver-
sion occurs when a depositary (collecting) bank pays an item on a forged
or unauthorized endorsement. Of course, apparent authority or estoppel,
of which negligence may be a part, may result in treatment of the endorse-
ment as authorized. In such a case conversion would not occur when -the
item is paid and the proceeds collected.
It is doubtful that section 3-406 should have been applied in the case.
The section contemplates situations in which a maker draws an instrument
in such a way that alteration or addition of names or figures is facilitated.16
In the instant case the checks were drawn by customers who were not negli-
gent, and plaintiff's employee endorsed the checks. Ordinarily, a drawee
or other paying bank must ascertain that a person presenting a check for
payment is the owner of the item as payee, endorsee, or assignee, or his
agent. Unless ownership, or apparent ownership or authority binding on the
owner, is made out, payment on the item is conversion.
Payment of Forged Check; Banker's Blanket Bond. Recovery on a banker's
blanket bond was denied in Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Hampton State
Bank,'7 where the insured collecting bank returned monies paid by a drawee
bank on a forged check. Check forms were furnished by Northwest Bank
to Pizza Inn, Inc. A stolen form was executed in the amount of $4000 by
forging the drawer's signature and writing in "Pizza Inn, Inc., Number 32" as
payee. An account was opened in the plaintiff Hampton Bank and the
forged check was deposited in the name of the payee. Plaintiff sent the
check through banking channels, and drawee Northwest Bank paid the
check. Plaintiff permitted withdrawals which exhausted the account. Upon
subsequently learning of the forgery, plaintiff so advised Northwest, repaid
the $4000, and asked for and received the forged check. Plaintiff made
claim of loss to defendant company on a "banker's blanket bond" insurance
contract.
12. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.406 (1968).
13. 498 S.W.2d at 402.
14. Id.
15. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.419 (1968).
16. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-406, Comment 2.
17. 497 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973).
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Under the terms of the bond, defendant insurance company agreed to in-
demnify plaintiff for certain losses including "any loss through FORGERY
• .. of, on or in any checks."' 8  The trial court found that plaintiff
breached its warranty of title because the endorsement under which it took
the check was forged. The judgment was that plaintiff was bound to repay
Northwest Bank and had a valid claim against defendant. On appeal, the
judgment was reversed.
The court of civil appeals rejected the assertion that the payee's endorse-
ment was forged. The payee was fictitious, and "[aln indorsement by any
person in the name of a named payee is effective if . . . a person signing
as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends the payee to have no interest
in the instrument."'1  The forger's endorsement of -the payee's name on the
check passed title to plaintiff bank. True, the check was unenforceable
against the drawer and should not have been paid by the drawee, but title
to the instrument passed. The drawee's loss in paying the check was not
due to lack of title but to its mistake in paying on a forged signature of
its depositor. In forwarding the check for collection, plaintiff bank en-
dorsed, "Pay Any Bank, P.E.G.," the latter letters meaning "prior endorse-
ments guaranteed." The court was of the opinion that these words did not
add to the warranties of a collecting bank already existent under section 4-
207 of the UCC. 20
Section 3-418 21 was cited as sustaining plaintiff's right to retain the $4000
received from Northwest Bank. Under this section, which follows the rule
of Price v. Neal,22 plaintiff had received "final payment" of the check.
Plaintiff qualified as a holder in due course for value, having received the
check in good faith without notice of defects and having allowed withdrawal
of the proceeds of collection. Plaintiff was in the peculiar position of trying
to establish the contrary in order to show that it was obliged to return the
$4000. Because plaintiff had a right to retain the $4000 paid on the draw-
ee's forged signature, it suffered no loss because of the forgery and had no
cause of action against defendant insurance company.
Statute of Limitations on Overdraft. The question of whether the two-year
or four-year statute of limitations 23 was applicable to a suit on an overdraft
was raised in First State Bank v. Tanner.24 Plaintiff bank by mistake paid
checks in excess of the drawer's account. Suit was filed two years and ten
months later. The court held that the action was brought on an indebted-
ness evidenced by a contract in writing and that the four-year statute of limi-
tations applied. The court stated:
A strict construction should not be applied by the courts in de-
termining what does and what does not constitute a contract in writ-
18. Id. at 83.
19. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405(a)(2); TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.405(a)(2) (1968).
20. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 4.207 (1968).
21. Id. § 3.418.
22. 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
23. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5526-27 (1958). The former applies to oral
obligations, while the latter to contracts in writing.
24. 495 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973).
1974]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ing within the meaning of Art. 5527. . . . It is not indispensable that
the written instrument relied upon contain an express promise to do
the things for the nonperformance of which the action is brought. It
is sufficient if the obligation or liability grows out of a written instru-
ment, not remotely but immediately, or if the written instrument ac-
knowledges a state of facts from which, by fair implication, the obliga-
tion or liability arises.25
Joint Payees. In Hinojosa v. Love 20 plaintiff brought suit on a printed note
form signed by defendant. National Bank of Commerce appeared as payee
on the form, and above its name was lettered plaintiff Love's name. Plain-
tiff obtained a default judgment. The trial court denied a new trial, but
this ruling was reversed on appeal and the cause remanded for trial. The
court of civil appeals held that on its face the note was payable to joint
payees. Section 3-116 of the UCC 27 was cited: "An instrument payable
to the order of two or more persons . . . is payable to all of them and may
be. . .enforced only by all of them."'28 Therefore, National Bank of Com-
merce was an indispensable party, and fundamental error was made in en-
tering judgment below.
Usury. In Texas Tool Traders v. W.E. Grace Manufacturing Co. 29 T and
G were engaged in the machinery business. T owed G $10,000. T sold
two machines to a purchaser in California but could not get them out of
a warehouse except upon payment of $18,000. G agreed to advance $18,000
to T in order to secure release of the machines, and in return, T agreed
to give G the $25,000 check received from the purchaser. The $25,000
was to be used to repay the $18,000 advance, to pay G $500 as a "handling
charge," and to apply $6500 on the earlier $10,000 debt. A writing was
drawn up setting out the understanding of the parties.
The agreement was carried out, and in about 22 days G received the pur-
chaser's check for $24,750 ($25,000 less 1% discount). G made other loans
to T. Subsequently, G sued on the debts owed by T, who counterclaimed
for statutory penalties alleged to be due because of the exaction of usury.
While the suit was pending, T became bankrupt and a trustee in bankruptcy
was substituted as defendant. The trial court rendered judgment for G for
the debts sued upon plus $10,000 exemplary damages and denied the coun-
terclaim for usury. On appeal the counterclaim was upheld.
G conceded that the $500 "handling charge" was interest. T as a corpor-
ation could lawfully contract for interest at the rate of 11/2 % a month, or
18% a year.80 But $500 for the use of $18,000 for 22 days amounted to well
25. Id. at 268.
26. 496 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973).
27. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.116 (1968).
28. Id.
29. 488 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972). The court of appeals judg-
ment has recently been modified by the Texas Supreme Court. 506 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.
1974). The supreme court held that of the $24,750 paid for the machines only $250
was received by G as interest. While this lesser amount was usurious, it was not in
excess of double the maximum rate. Accordingly, the trustee in bankruptcy was al-
lowed judgment for twice the interest received ($500) plus $2500 attorney's fees.
30. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Supp. 1973).
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over 40% interest. A statute provided that one "who contracts for, charges
or receives interest which is greater than the amount authorized 'by this sub-
title, shall forfeit to the obligor twice the amount of interest contracted
for, charged or received . . ."; and that one "who contracts for, charges or
receives interest which is in excess of double the amount of interest allowed
by this Subtitle shall forfeit as an additional penalty, all principal as well
as interest and all other charges .... 1
The court of civil appeals held that the trustee in bankruptcy should re-
cover the principal actually repaid ($17,750 with cancellation of the remain-
ing $250 debt) plus double the interest charged ($1000) plus attorney's fees
($2500). Usury was found in that the contingency existed under the con-
tract that G might receive more than the maximum legal rate of interest.
Further, the contingency had come to pass. Still further, the reality of the
$18,000 loan was that it was expected to be repaid in a matter of days.
The court had no difficulty in construing the statutes as making the penal-
ties applicable to excessive interest charged a corporation, even though the
pertinent sections were in different subtitles.
G tried to avoid the penalties of usury by showing that on its books of
account the whole amount of the $24,750 check was applied to the principal
owed by T. G contended that it had a right to do this because T had
given no directions as to application of the check. The court rejected the
argument as contrary to the clear agreement of T and G as to how the pro-
ceeds of sale should be used.
To cap the adversity suffered by G in this litigation, the court held that
G's claims for loans and deceit in other transactions could not be set off
against the claim of the trustee in bankruptcy for the penalties of usury.
The claims were not mutual debts or credits which could be set off against
the other.3 2  The result would have been otherwise if T had not been
adjudged bankrupt.
Two other cases in which usury questions arose should be noticed. In
Sud v. Morris33 plaintiff sued for double usurious interest paid on a promis-
sory note. He alleged that the note was backdated half a year and 72%
interest paid in advance. The note was signed by plaintiff and MPS Pro-
duction Company as joint and several makers. Defendants answered by
plea in abatement, asserting that necessary parties had not been joined as
plaintiffs. The plea was sustained, and plaintiff appealed. The judgment
was reversed and remanded because defendants did not plead facts with par-
ticularity showing that other parties should have been joined as plaintiffs.
The court stated that if MPS was a corporation, it was not a necessary
party because it could agree to interest not exceeding 11/2 % per month. De-
fendants did not -aver that MPS was not a corporation, and no proof was
offered that persons not appearing on the note were primary obligors. The
court approved holdings of other jurisdictions that where a corporation and
31. Id. art. 5069-1.06 (1971).
32. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 108a (1970).
33. 492 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973).
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an individual are joint makers on a note which is usurious, the individual
may prosecute the penalty action without joinder of the corporation . 4
In Maloney v. Andrews35 suit was brought to recover unpaid rentals on
a lease. The lease agreement provided that the lessee should pay a "late
charge" of $1 a day for each day he was delinquent in paying monthly rent,
and charges were cumulative from month to month. The lessee counter-
claimed for usury. The court held that the constitutional and statutory pro-
hibitions applied to loans and lenders of money and not to lease agreements.
Judgment was affirmed for $600 unpaid rentals plus attorney's fees. Evi-
dence supported the jury's finding that $600 was due "after allowance of
all credits." One may argue that the late charges were excessive and uncon-
scionable.
Miscellaneous. Waters v. Waters " illustrates that a negotiable instrument
can be transferred as a gift by simple delivery. Neither endorsement nor
written assignment is necessary.
In Gulf Collateral, Inc. v. $ohnston37 plaintiff was assignee of checks
given to purchase gambling chips in a Nevada casino. The checks were
dishonored, and plaintiff induced defendant to enter into a compromise
agreement and to execute twelve new checks, each dated one month apart.
Payment was stopped after two checks were paid. The court held that the
ten remaining checks were unenforceable because plaintiff stood in the same
shoes as the gambling casino and was not purchaser for value without notice.
Gaming tainted the compromise transaction.
Hill v. Citizens National Bank38 is a case in which lenders made depos-
its in defendant bank to be used by a borrower for a specified purpose.
Having this knowledge, defendant was held liable to the lenders when it
placed the deposits in the borrower's general account and applied them to
other debts of the borrower. The opinion sets out the characteristics of a
special deposit as distinguished from a general deposit.
II. SALES
Warranties of Quality. A frequent subject of contention in sales litigation
is the scope and operation of warranties. In Mobile Housing, Inc. v. Stone8 9
plaintiffs, purchasers of a mobile home, sued for rescission. The -trial court
found that defendant seller showed a model mobile home to illustrate what
plaintiffs would receive; that a mobile home which had many defects and
did not conform to the model home in important details was delivered to
plaintiffs; that plaintiffs promptly rejected the mobile home; and that de-
fendant failed to correct the defects and took back the home twelve weeks
after delivery. Plaintiffs won a judgment for return of their down payment,
and this was affirmed on appeal.
34. Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank v. Recile, 302 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. La. 1969),
Grove v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 166 N.E.2d 630 (Ill. Ct. App. 1960).
35. 483 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972), error rel. n.r.e.
36. 498 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973).
37. 496 S.W.2d 123' (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
38. 495 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973).
39. 490 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973).
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The purchase agreement stated that buyer took the new mobile home "as
is," that no express or implied warrantits were made, and that no warranty
of merchantability or fitness was made. It was further agreed that "there
have been no descriptions, samples or models used or regarded as a part
of this contract." The court of civil appeals said that the record was clear
that plaintiffs did not buy a mobile home on -the basis of any descriptions
other than those relating to the model shown. Therefore, defendant made
warranties under sections 2-313(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the UCC.40  The
disclaimer provisions of the purchase agreement were inconsistent with the
express warranties, and a problem of interpretation was presented. The
court had no difficulty in concluding that the express warranties rested on
"dickered" aspects of the individual bargain and that the words of disclaimer
should be rejected as repugnant to the basic bargain. 41 The parol evidence
rule was inapplicable because the purchase agreement was incomplete and
ambiguous. Indeed, the agreement made reference to the model house, and
parol evidence was admissible to remove ambiguities in the description.
In the course of its opinion, the court had occasion to contrast the rem-
edies of a buyer for breach of warranty before and after the UCC was
enacted. Under section 2-60142 a buyer has a right to reject goods if the
tender of delivery fails "in any respect" to conform to the contract.
A similar problem of conflict between disclaimer provision and specific
warranty was presented in S-C Industries v. American Hydroponics Systems,
Inc.43 S-C became a dealer for American and bought hydroponic equip-
ment and greenhouse components. 44 The components were assembled into
a greenhouse, which was used to grow tomatoes. After two years the green-
house collapsed, and S-C recovered judgment against American, which was
affirmed on appeal.
The purchase form signed by S-C in buying the greenhouse components
stated that no express or implied warranty was made except a printed war-
ranty accompanying the goods on delivery. The printed warranty was to
the effect that the goods were free from defects in materials and workman-
ship under normal use and service for one year. For breach of the warranty
American agreed to give credit or replace defective parts. Prior to pur-
chase, American supplied S-C with a set of plans and specifications for the
greenhouse. One specification was for a steel truss: "42' Rigid Steel Frame
all bolt connections-20 PSF Snowload, 16 PSF Windload." This language
was interpreted to mean that the truss would withstand a vertical load of
twenty pounds per square foot. The trial court found that the greenhouse
collapsed because the steel truss weakened under a load of less than twenty
pounds per square foot.
40. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.313(a)(1), (2), (3) (1968).
41. Citing UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(a), TEX, Bus. & COMM. CODE
ANN. § 2.316(a) (1968).
42. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.601 (1968).
43. 468 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1972).
44. Hydroponics is the science of growing plants in chemicals and water without
the use of soil.
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It was clear that the truss specification standing alone was a warranty.
The question was whether the disclaimer and printed warranty superseded
the specification. The court held that "while the special warranty form pro-
vided the exclusive remedy should any component be defective, it did not
supersede the specific express warranty which extended to the design capa-
bility of nondefective structural members intended to perform as an integral
part of the greenhouse building."' 45 The court also held that the implied
warranty of merchantability was breached, since the purchase order and
printed warranty did not mention merchantability and the disclaiming
language was not conspicuous. 46 To -the argument that defendant was liable
only for replacement of ,the inadequate truss the court answered that it would
be unreasonable to fragment the greenhouse sale into separate sales of con-
stituent parts. Defendant was held to a specific warranty that if the
greenhouse was constructed according to plans, it would withstand a certain
load.
In W.G. Tufts & Son v. Herider Farms, Inc. 47 plaintiff bought a weed
killer from defendant. The latter knew that the weed killer would be
sprayed on plaintiff's pasture. Representation was made that the weed kill-
er was the same product plaintiff had used under a different label. The
weed killer was arsenical and was applied to the pasture. The results were
loss of hay and cattle, and incurring of veterinary fees. Plaintiff recovered
judgment on express warranty, which was affirmed on appeal.
The drums of weed killer bore labels which directed that cattle should
not be permitted to graze after application. Findings were made that plain-
tiff's employees were contributorily negligent in not reading and following
the printed directions. Nevertheless, the court was of the opinion that the
judgment below should be sustained on a warranty theory. The instructions
on the labels were not a "basis of the bargain" 48 between the parties and
were irrelevant to the determination that an express warranty was made that
the weed killer was the same as plaintiff had used previously.
A buyer was unsuccessful in setting up breach of warranty in Tracor, Inc.
v. Austin Supply & Drywall Co.49 Defendant ordered a quantity of
"one inch" sheetrock from plaintiff. Nothing was said about how the ma-
terial was to be used. The sheetrock was delivered, and defendant rejected
it because defendant's building project required homogeneous sheetrock
rather than the laminated type delivered. The trial court found that the
sheetrock delivered was of fair average quality and fitted the ordinary pur-
poses for which it was used. Since the material fitted the description of
goods ordered by defendant, a contract was entered into which defendant
had breached.
The court of civil appeals held that plaintiff had complied with express
and implied warranties. Defendant admitted that homogeneous and lami-
45. 468 F.2d at 855.
46. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(b) (1968).
47. 485 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
48. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.313 (1968).
49. 484 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
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nated types of sheetrock were standard products. However, defendant urged
that there was no meeting of minds since a latent ambiguity existed as to
defendant's use of the term "one inch" sheetrock, while plaintiff knew there
was a patent ambiguity. The court responded that the problem was not one
of latent or patent ambiguity but one concerning the particular purpose for
which buyer intended the sheetrock. Since defendant did not inform plain-
tiff of his particular purpose, the implied warranty of fitness for the purpose
did not arise.
Another type of mistake was made by the buyer in Monarch Marking
Systems Co. v. Reed's Photo Mart, Inc.50 Breach of warranty was not in-
volved. Defendant's vice president began filling out a purchase order for
five different types of adhesive labels. He filled in the blank spaces for
four types of labels, noting the quantity of each as "2 M." He was then
interrupted and did not come back to the order form for several hours. La-
ter, he completed the order, writing in "4 MM" in the quantity column for
the fifth type of labels. Plaintiff received the order and shipped defendant
four million labels of the fifth type, weighing 622 pounds. Because its vice
president thought he was ordering 4000 labels of the fifth type, defendant
refused the labels, and plaintiff sued for the price. The Texas Supreme
Court upheld the judgment for plaintiff in the trial court.
The trial court found that "MM" by custom and usage meant "one mil-
lion." The jury refused to find that plaintiff knew that the order for "4
MM" labels was a mistake. The supreme court was of the opinion that de-
fendant had made a unilateral mistake. Relief from the mistake could only
be had if the mistaken party could put the other party in the same situation
he was in prior to the transaction in question. In the instant case there
was no proof of any effort on the defendant's part to restore plaintiff to
its former situation.
Bass v. General Motors Corp.51 is a products liability case in which the
buyer was denied recovery. Plaintiff was injured when her new Buick auto-
mobile struck a light pole. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer and the selling
dealer. At the trial plaintiff testified about her accident, which occurred
two months and 4000 miles after the automobile was purchased. She had
stopped the automobile, preparing to back out of a private driveway. She
shifted into reverse, depressed the accelerator, and the car shot backward.
Being frightened, she shifted into drive, and the car shot forward and hit
a light pole. The trial court withdrew the case from the jury and rendered
judgment for defendants. The judgment was affirmed on appeal.
The court of civil appeals reviewed the evidence in the trial court. Ex-
pert witnesses who had inspected and tested the car could not find any de-
fect which would cause unexpected acceleration. Plaintiff and her husband
gave testimony that after the accident each had had an experience in which
the automobile had suddenly accelerated without reason.
The court commented that the Texas Supreme Court had committed itself
50. 485 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1972).
51. 491 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
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to the rule of strict liability expressed in section 402A of the Restatement
of the Law of Torts,52 but that section requires proof that the product caus-
ing harm was in a defective condition when it left the hands of the manu-
facturer or seller. Plaintiff was held not to have sustained the burden of
proving that some part of her automobile was defective. Mere proof of the
accident was not enough. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.5 3 was dis-
tinguished. There, plaintiff's automobile swerved off the road into a brick
wall. It was impossible to determine after the accident whether parts of
the steering wheel mechanism had been defective. Expert witnesses ad-
vanced the opinion that something went wrong between the steering wheel
and the front wheels. This testimony along with plaintiff's testimony, was
held sufficient to raise a fact issue for jury determination. The instant case
was different in that the automobile was intact and expert witnesses could
find nothing wrong in the accelerating mechanisms. 54
Measure of Damages for Breach of Warranty. Calculation of damages for
breach of warranties of quality was involved in Neuman v. Spector Wrecking
& Salvage Co.5 5 and General Supply & Equipment Co. v. Phillips.50
In the Neuman case defendant sold to plaintiff a used truck scale for $3700
plus $553 installation charges. An implied warranty of fitness for purpose
and an express "new scale warranty" providing for replacement of defective
parts were made. The scale collapsed on its fifth use, and defendant re-
fused to repair or replace the scale. The trial court gave plaintiff
judgment for $4500, the net cost of replacement of the scale. The court
of civil appeals reversed and remanded because of error in the measure of
damages. The court said that the usual measure of damages in a case of
this kind is the difference in market value of the equipment in the condition
in which it was delivered and in the condition it should have been in accord-
ing to the contract. This measure is stated in section 2-714(b) of the
UCC.5 7 The concluding phrase in the section allows a different measure
if "special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount."
However, plaintiff's pleading and proof did not suport a recovery under this
exception.' Error was also found in that the judgment was in excess of the
purchase price and put plaintiff in a better position than if the contract had
been properly performed.
In the Phillips case plaintiff operated four large greenhouses and was in
the business of growing and selling plants, principally chrysanthemums. He
bought and installed plastic panels as covering for his greenhouses. De-
fendant seller represented that the panels would last five to seven years and
would not darken. Actually, the panels darkened within -two years, cutting
off light from the plants in the greenhouses. As a result, plants failed to
52. Citing McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
53. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
54. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964), was similarly distinguished.
55. 490 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973).
56. 490 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
57. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.714(b) (1968).
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grow and blooms failed to mature. Plaintiff's judgment for $176,000 in the
trial court was reversed and remanded because of errors in instructions as
to damages.
The evidence in the case amply supported findings of express and implied
warranties and of their breach. The court said that the ordinary measure
of damages stated in section 2-714(b) of the UCC, the difference between
value of goods accepted and value if they had been as warranted, was not
applicable. Plaintiff was entitled to incidental and consequential damages
under section 2-715.58 Plaintiff replaced the defective panels on two of the
greenhouses, and no structural damage was done. Thereafter, he went out
of business and sold the four greenhouses. The court did not think that
diminution in market value of the greenhouses was a proper measure of
damages. The court was of the opinion "that the incidental damages in-
volved here would be the reasonable cost of replacing the defective paneling
with equal quality as that represented by appellant, less the salvage value,
if any, of the defective paneling."
59
Consequential damages were regarded as including loss of profits, but the
loss had to be a natural and probable consequence of the breaches of war-
ranties, and the amount had to be shown with reasonable certainty. Plain-
tiff had no previous record of profits in producing and selling chrysanthe-
mums. His estimate of lost profits was based on the assumption that he
could have grown a crop every fourteen weeks and would have made five
cents on each plant sold. The court said that this testimony was "purely
conjectural and speculative."60  The proper measure of damages was "the
difference between the reasonable market value of each crop of mums as
actually raised and sold and the reasonable market value of the crop which
would have been produced and sold had the . . . paneling been as war-
ranted." 6' 1 This measure would allow for fluctuation in market prices.
Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp.6 2 is a lengthy and involved
case in which a television station sued RCA, as a seller of equipment, for
breach of contract and seller counterclaimed for equipment delivered.
Plaintiff alleged fraud, late and insufficient performance on RCA's part, and
breaches of warranty resulting in delay in getting the television station on
the air and leading eventually to shutdown. Plaintiff had a judgment for
$1 million in the district court. On appeal the cause was reversed and re-
manded because of erroneous instructions by the lower court and inconsis-
tent findings by the jury.
The appellate court had occasion to discuss remedies for fraud, the bind-
ing effect of disclaimer provisions, remedies for repudiation of a sales con-
58. Id. § 2.715: Incidental damages include "any other reasonable expense incident
to the delay or other breach." Consequential damages include "any loss resulting from
general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contract-
ing had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or oth-
erwise .... "
59. 490 S.W.2d at 920.
60. Id. at 921.
61. Id.
62. 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973).
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tract under sections 2-610 and 2-711 of the UCC,68 and the measure of
damages for repudiation under section 2-713(a). 64 Allowance of lost profits
was held error because plaintiff's business was new and their determination
was wholly speculative. The court recognized that the parties could agree
to substitute for or modify a remedy for breach of warranty and to limit
liability for consequential damages.0 But both provisions were subject to
section 2-302,66 which authorizes a court to refuse enforcement of uncon-
scionable terms. The lower court was directed to make express findings on
the question of unconscionability.
Products Liability Indemnity Contract. In K & S Oil Well Service, Inc.
v. Cabot Corp.67 S, a manufacturer, sold B a work-over rig. P, an em-
ployee of B, suffered severe injuries while working on the rig. P obtained
judgment against S for $238,600 because of defects in the rig causing the
accident, and S obtained judgment against B for the same amount. On ap-
peal the latter judgment was reversed.
P's recovery against S was based on the strict liability imposed on a manu-
facturer who sells and delivers machinery containing defects rendering it
dangerous to life and limb of a user. Section 402A of the Restatement of
the Law of Torts was cited. Lack of privity of contract between P and
S was no defense. The face of the sales order form signed by S and B
contained the expression "subject to the terms and conditions on the reverse
side." The fourth paragraph on the reverse side stated a warranty of mer-
chantability for ninety days. There followed in capital letters a limitation
of liability to replacement of parts and correction of defects. This warranty
was in lieu of all other warranties, express or implied. Then followed the
statement, still in capital letters: "We shall not be liable for indirect, spe-
cial, general or consequential damages or injuries and you agree to indem-
nify us from loss, injury or damage to third parties. ' 68
The court commented that the fourth paragraph was entitled "WAR-
RANTY" and that the agreement to indemnify was a different subject sur-
rounded by unrelated terms. Ordinarily, an agreement to indemnify does
not protect an indemnitee against the consequence of his own negligence
unless this obligation is unequivocal in terms. Fairness requires that an in-
denmitor be aware that he has assumed such an obligation. The court was
of the opinion that the indemnity agreement was "hidden." Because it was
a small part of a larger contract, the indemnity agreement had to be "con-
spicuous" in order to impart fair notice to the indemnitor. The holding was
that the indemnity agreement should be regarded as of no effect. A su-
preme court decision 69 was cited as saying that Texas has moved very close
63. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.610, 2.711 (1968).
64. Id. § 2.713(a).
65. Citing UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719, TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.719 (1968). The court said that the substituted remedy-replacement of defective
parts-did not fail of its essential purpose under § 2-719(b).
66. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.302 (1968).
67. 491 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
68. Id. at 736.




to the "express negligence" rule. Exculpatory provisions and indemnity
agreements are narrowly construed, and if one is to be excused from liability
for one's own negligence, or to be indemnified for liability for such fault,
the language should be clear. Preferably, the word "negligence" should be
used, as well as a "save harmless" clause. In the present case the indemnity
language failed to say in direct terms that the indemnitor should indemnify
the manufacturer if the latter were held liable for injuries resulting from de-
fects in the work-over rig.
Sale of False Warehouse Receipts. The warranty made when a seller ne-
gotiates false warehouse receipts was involved in Simon v. Estate of Allen.70
B was a buyer and seller of cotton and owned several warehouses. A and
S financed B, taking warehouse receipts as security. S's arrangements with
B were structured so that when loans were repaid, warehouse receipts were
returned, and it appeared that sales were made. The cotton involved was
stored in B's warehouses, and he was able to remove cotton from storage
without redeeming or canceling warehouse receipts held by A and S.
B got into financial difficulties, and he dishonored two drafts drawn by
S amounting to $576,000. A few days later, B gave checks to A for
$550,000, which were dishonored. Consultations were had among the par-
ties. It was agreed that A would borrow from his bank and purchase the
cotton represented by the warehouse receipts attached to S's drafts, as well
as an additional group of warehouse receipts representing cotton bales held
by B for S. The agreement was carried out, and S received $870,000 for
the warehouse receipts. Several weeks later, A discovered that 7459 bales
of cotton covered by the warehouse receipts were missing. A recovered
judgment against S for $678,000, the value of the missing bales of cotton,
and this was affirmed on appeal. The court of civil appeals held that
S made express warranties of quantity by stating on its three invoices to
B the number of bales "sold." When S sold nonexistent cotton to A, he
breached both express and implied warranties. 71 Section 7-507 of the
UCC7 2 was cited: "Where a person . . . transfers a document of title
for value otherwise than as a mere intermediary . . . unless other-
wise agreed he warrants to his immediate purchaser . . . in addition to any
warranty made in selling goods. . . (3) that his . . . transfer is rightful and
fully effective with respect to the title to the document and the goods it rep-
resents." In quoting this section, the court omitted the italicized portion.
This seems to have been an inadvertence because it is this expression, rather
than phrase (3), which declares the source of the seller's warranties con-
cerning the quality and quantity of the goods sold.
Statute of Frauds. In LTV Aerospace Corp. v. Bateman73 plaintiff entered
into oral contract to build 8000 shipping crates -for defendant within a
year's period. The crates were to be built to specifications and to be used
70. 497 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
71. Citing UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-711, TEX. Bus. &
COMM. ANN. §§ 2.313, 2.314, 2.711 (1968).
72. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 7.507 (1968).
73. 492 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
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as containers for all-terrain vehicles to be exported to Southeast Asia.
Plaintiff hired workmen, purchased raw materials and plant equipment, and
began building the crates. Defendant gave notice and stopped ordering af-
ter 653 crates and 450 container bottoms were built and delivered. Plaintiff
sued for lost profits and recovered $25,000. The judgment was affirmed
on appeal.
Section 2-201 of the UCC74 makes a sales contract for the price of $500
or more unenforceable unless a sufficient writing is executed and signed by
the party against whom enforcement is sought. An exception states that an
oral contract may be enforced "if the goods are to be specially manufactured
for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course
of the seller's business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received
and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for
the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or
commitments for their procurement. ' 75  The court held that the facts were
clear that the exception was satisfied. Issuance of a purchase order by de-
fendant for 900 crates, unsigned by plaintiff, was a request to deliver a cer-
tain number of containers under the oral contract and not a superseding
written contract. The finding as to lost profits was supported by the evi-
dence, and defendant failed to show that plaintiff could have mitigated his
damages.
Miscellaneous. Section 2-403(b) of the UCC states: "Any entrusting of
possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him
power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course
of business."' 76 In Gallagher v. Unenrolled Motor Vessel River Queen,77
the court held that the section had no application where plaintiffs rented
a stall at Smith's marina and placed in it their 38-foot pleasure motor boat.
Smith operated a business of selling boats separately and apart from the
business of renting stalls. Smith sold plaintiffs' boat to defendants. Plain-
tiffs obtained judgment for possession of the boat, which was affirmed on
appeal. The court was of the opinion that there was no entrusting to a mer-
chant within the meaning of section 2-403(b).
Proper tender of the price in a sale was the issue in Modern Aero Sales,
Inc. v. Winzen Research, Inc.78  Plaintiff exercised an option to purchase
an aircraft by mailing an "envelope draft" for the price, which was received
by defendant within the time limited by contract. Defendant returned the
draft, professing unfamiliarity with it and stating that a bill of sale would
be delivered if "timely legal tender" were presented. Plaintiff received the
draft a day after the option period expired. Plaintiff then sent an employee
by air to defendant's city in a vain attempt to deliver a cashier's check.
The court of civil appeals reversed the trial court and rendered judgment
74. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (1968).
75. Id. § 2.201(c)(1).
76. Id. § 2.403(b).
77. 475 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1973).
78. 486 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
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for plaintiff for breach of contract. Citing section 2-511(b) of the UCC,79
the court held that the tender of the envelope draft was a means of payment
"current in the ordinary course of business," that defendant had a right to
insist on payment in legal tender but was required to allow a reasonable
extension of time, that the cashier's check was tendered within a reasonable
time, and that the refusal to accept the check was based not on objection
to the medium of tender but on a mistaken belief that the option period
had expired. The court observed that if defendant had refused the cashier's
check and insisted on money, there was time during the day to meet defend-
ant's requirement.
Ideal Builders Hardware Co. v. Cross Construction Co.8 0 holds that sec-
tion 2-725 of the UCCsl has lengthened to four years the statute of limita-
tions for commencing a suit on an open account for sales. The older two-
year statute82 applicable to actions on open accounts has been superseded
by section 2-725 with respect to sales transactions.
III. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Financing Statement as Security Agreement. The question whether a fi-
nancing statement can have the effect of a security agreement was raised
in Mosley v. Dallas Entertainment Co.83 Plaintiff sold a private club to B.
Among items of personal property sold was a cash register. A financing
statement was filed with the secretary of state showing plaintiff as creditor
and B as debtor. The financing statement recited that it covered "all in-
ventory, equipment, furniture, fixtures, machines ...now owned or here-
after acquired .. .in connection with the operation of a private club ...
together with all goods, chattels and property described in . . the Security
Agreement of even date herewith."'8 4 Subsequently, defendant, who was in
the cash register business, bought the cash register and resold it. Defendant
had no actual knowledge of plaintiff's interest in the cash register when he
bought it. Plaintiff recovered judgment against defendant for conversion,
but this was reversed on appeal.
Section 9-203(a) of the UCC8 5 provides that a "security interest is not
enforceable against the debtor or third parties" unless "the debtor has signed
a security agreement which contains a description of the collateral." The
court of civil appeals quoted from the official comment to section 9-203 to
the effect that the formal requisites for a security agreement are in the na-
ture of a Statute of Frauds. Oral evidence was insufficient to establish a
security agreement.
The financing statement was written on a standard form supplied by the
79. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.511(b) (1968).
80. 491 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973); accord, W.W.
Price Lumber Co. v. Cook, 497 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973), error
granted.
81. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (1968).
82. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (1958).
83. 496 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973), error dismissed w.o.j.
84. Id. at 238.
85. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.203(a) (1968).
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secretary of state. It was signed by plaintiff and a party alleged to be the
agent of debtor. The court stated that the Code makes no provision for
a naked financing statement to be enforced as a security agreement. "A
financing statement cannot serve as a security agreement where it does not
grant the creditor an interest in the collateral and does not identify the obli-
gation owed to the creditor." 86
The result in the case is sound. A good deal more than the financing
statement was needed to establish the nature and bounds of the security
agreement. The notice given by the filed financing statement should have
reference to a written agreement and not to an oral one, which is frequently
uncertain.
Assignment of Accounts Receivable. In Manes Construction Co. v. Wall-
board Coatings Co. 87 defendant general contractor entered into contract with
A, a subcontractor, to do sheetrock work on ,three apartment projects. A
assigned its accounts receivable to plaintiff, its principal supplier, to secure
past and future sales on open account. A financing statement was executed
and filed with the secretary of state. Actual notice was communicated to
defendant of the assignment. Thereafter defendant paid monies directly to
A. Plaintiff recovered judgment for $45,000 for monies so paid.
The court cited section 9-318(3) of the UCC88 and held that defendant
had subjected itself to double liability. "The account debtor is authorized
to pay the assignor until the account debtor receives notification that the
amount due or to become due has been assigned and that payment is to
be made to the assignee." 89 After defendant received notice of the assign-
ment, it made payments to A at its peril to the extent of the debt owed
to plaintiff.
Perfection of Security Interest in Proceeds of Notes. Bierschwale v. Oakes9°
is a complicated case in which plaintiffs sued to impose a constructive trust
on notes received by defendants. Bank of Texas and Smith held perfected
security interests in some of the notes by virtue of possession. Payments
on the notes, however, were made to defendant Oakes, and the pledge
agreement with Smith stated that Oakes had a right to collect so long as
no default occurred on his main obligation. The trial court ordered the ob-
ligor on the notes to make payments into the registry of the court. Subse-
quently, Bank of Texas intervened in the suit. Still later, defendant Oakes
defaulted on his notes to the bank and Smith.
Plaintiffs were successful in proving fraud on defendants' part and in es-
tablishing a constructive trust. With respect to the notes pledged to the
bank, plaintiffs asserted prior rights to payments into the registry of the court
before the bank intervened. With respect to the notes pledged to Smith,
plaintiffs asserted prior rights to payments made before Oakes defaulted on
his note to Smith. Both claims were upheld by the court.
86. 496 S.W.2d at 240.
87. 497 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973).
88. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.318(c) (1968).
89. Id.
90. 497 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973), error granted.
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The payments into the court's registry were "proceeds" of the notes, but
they were not in the possession of the bank or Smith. The bank had not
filed a financing statement; Smith had filed such a statement, but it did not
mention "proceeds." Citing sections 9-203, -301, -302 and -306 of the
UCC,91 the court held that plaintiffs were in the position of a lien creditor
and that the bank and Smith had not perfected their security interests in
the proceeds of the notes. Accordingly, plaintiffs were allowed prior rights
to the proceeds deposited in the court before the bank intervened and before
Oakes defaulted on his obligation to Smith.
Miscellaneous Liens. Plaintiffs, who were painting contractors, brought suit
in Inman v. Clark92 for foreclosure of their mechanic's and materialman's
lien. Defendants were the purchasers of a townhouse on which plaintiffs
worked. The seller and builder of the townhouse contracted with plaintiffs
for their services. Plaintiffs began work before the house was sold and fin-
ished after defendants moved in and received their deed. Thereafter de-
fendants recorded their deed, and two days later plaintiffs recorded their
mechanic's and materialman's lien affidavit. Reversing the judgment below,
the court of civil appeals held that plaintiffs' lien was enforceable against
the townhouse.
The court stated that after furnishing work and materials to the seller of
the townhouse, plaintiffs
had 120 days after completion of their work to secure their lien ...
[Defendants] bought the property before the expiration of the 120 day
period and . . . therefore had constructive notice of . . . [plaintiffs']
existing right to file their affidavits. . . . When there are newly
constructed improvements on property the purchaser is under a duty
to determine whether there are any outstanding mechanic's and material-
man's liens against the property. 93
Defendants conceded that plaintiffs filed their lien affidavit within the
statutory period.9 4  Defendants could not qualify as bona fide purchasers
without notice, for when they moved into the townhouse, they could plainly
see that plaintiffs were furnishing labor and materials within the period for
filing the affidavit. The fact that plaintiffs did not mail notices95 to defend-
ants was immaterial.
In Flores v. Didear Van & Storage Co.96 plaintiffs stored household
goods with defendant company. A storage agreement was executed, and
plaintiff husband gave his wife's mother's address as the address through
which he could always be reached. Plaintiff husband then went into mili-
tary service for three years and was assigned outside the United States for
the greater part of the time. His wife accompanied him during substantial
parts of his service.
91. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.203, 9.301, 9.302, 9.306 (1968).
92. 485 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972).
93. Id. at 374.
94. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Supp. 1974).
95. id. art. 5453(3).
96. 489 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972).
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Two years and three months after plaintiff husband went into service, his
wife went to defendant's place of business to pay storage charges. She was
told that the goods had been sold for nonpayment of charges. The only
storage charge that had 'been paid was for the first month. Plaintiffs sued
for conversion, and the defense was that the goods had been foreclosed upon
for default in payment of charges. Judgment for defendant in the lower
court was reversed and rendered on appeal.
Section 7-210 of the UCC9 7 authorizes a warehouseman to foreclose on
stored goods for nonpayment of charges. All persons known to claim inter-
ests in the goods must be notified, and the notification must be delivered
in person or sent by registered or certified letter to the last known address
of any person to be notified. Among other matters, the notification "must
include . . . a demand for payment within a specified time not less than
ten days after receipt of the notification" and a statement that unless the
storage claim is paid within the stated time, the goods will be advertised
for sale and sold by auction at a specified time and place. Defendant sent
a notice of sale by certified mail to the address given by plaintiff husband.
The notice was returned to defendant unopened and marked "unclaimed."
The notice was dated April 15, 1968, and demanded payment of accrued
claims by April 24. It went on to say that public sale of the goods would
take place at a later specified date if the demand were not paid.
The court of appeals held that defendant's notification was effective and
valid. However, the demand in the notice was defective. The statute re-
quires that demand for payment should be within a specified time "not less
than ten days after receipt of the notification." The instant demand was
for payment within less than ten days after the date of the notice. The
court said that a warehouseman's remedy for collection of charges is pro-
vided by statutory law only. The enforcement of a warehouseman's lien
"must be accomplished in strict compliance with the terms of the statute
upon which such power is granted."9 s The notice sent plaintiffs did not
comply with the statute, and the sale was, therefore, void. Defendant was
liable for conversion.
Recent Legislation Affecting Secured Transactions. During the past year
the Texas Legislature amended and revised article 9 of the UCC.99 The
changes are extensive and became effective on January 1, 1974. A cata-
loguing of the changes cannot be attempted here. Obviously, careful ex-
amination of -the 1973 amendments is called for on the part of anyone who
counsels concerning security interests in personal property.
97. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 7.210 (1968).
98. 489 S.W.2d at 409.
99. Ch. 400, [1973] Tex. Laws 999. Amendments were also made to certain sec-
tions in articles (chapters) 1, 2, and 5. Id. at 997.
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